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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CRIMINAL LAW: INELIGIBILITY FOR PAROLE IS NOT
AMONG THE "CONSEQUENCES" OF A GUILTY PLEA FOR
PURPOSES OF FEDERAL RULE 11
INELIGIBILITY for parole is not a "consequence" of which a de-
fendant must be aware before his guilty plea can be accepted, the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held in Trujillo v. United
States.' After being advised that probation could not be granted
and that conviction carried a mandatory minimum five-year sentence,
appellant pleaded guilty to a charge of unlawfully selling marijuana.
The district court, without informing him that parole would be un-
available, accepted Trujillo's plea and sentenced him to ten years im-
prisonment.2 His section 2255 motion to vacate the sentence 3 was
denied and he appealed, asserting that the unavailability of parole was
a consequence of his plea of which he should have been informed.
The Fifth Circuit, acknowledging that rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure prohibits the acceptance of a guilty plea
without prior determination by the judge that the accused fully
appreciates the "consequences of the plea," affirmed, holding that
congressional refusal to make parole available to marijuana offend-
ers4 is not a "consequence" envisoned by the rule.!
Trujillo represents the first appellate consideration of rule 11
"consequences" since the 1966 amendment of the rule. The Ad-
visory Committee's Note to former rule 11, promulgated in 1945,
indicates that it was intended as a restatement of then existing law
and practice;6 i.e., a court was prohibited from accepting a guilty
plea without first determining that it was made voluntarily with
an "understanding of the nature of the charge."7 Rule 11 was sub-
sequently interpreted to include the additional requirement that a
'377 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1967).
2 Id. at 268.
3 Act of June 25, 1948, § 2255, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964).
'See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7237.
377 F.2d at 269.
'Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 11, reprinted in 8 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
11.01[2] (2d ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as MOORE].
7 Fed. R, Crim. P. 11, 327 U.S. 842 (1945).
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defendant understand the "consequences of his plea," an accession
which the recent amendment to the rule sought to codify.8 The Com-
mittee pointed out that the rule was necessary to insure fair and
adequate procedures at the important pleading stage, since a large
majority of criminal defendants plead guilty, and comparatively few
cases continue to trial.9 No attempt was made to define "conse-
quences," however, leaving the term to be construed in the light of
pre-amendment precedent.10 At the minimum, a trial court will
ordinarily instruct a defendant on the "range of allowable punish-
ments" following conviction,1 that acceptance of a guilty plea is
equivalent to conviction,2a and that all non-jurisdictional defenses
are thereby waived.'8 What other factors rule 11 comprehends re-
mains unsettled.
Whether factors affecting the potential length of actual detention
are to be considered "consequences" within the ambit of rule 11 has
evoked disagreement among the federal courts. In accepting a plea
of guilty from a youthful offender, for example, the courts are di-
vided on whether it is necessary to inform the defendant of the possi-
bility that he may be sentenced under the Federal Youth Corrections
Act which provides for detention of potentially longer duration than
the maximum adult punishment for an equivalent offense.' 4 In
another context, the threat of extended confinement has been held
to entitle a defendant to warning that a prosecutor will enter evi-
dence of recidivism only when a plea of not guilty is tendered.1
8 Fm. R. CuM. P. 11, Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 171 (1966), and
cases cited therein.
9 FED. R. Cmum. P. 11, Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 171 (1966); 8 MooRE
11.02[1] (77.2% of all federal criminal defendants pleaded guilty in 1963).1 0 See 8 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcrICE 11.06[2] (Supp. 1966).
11 Cf. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724 (1948).
1 3 See, e.g., United States v. Spada, 331 F.2d 995 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 865 (1964); Lockhart v. United States, 293 F.2d 314 (8th Cir. 1961) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 1003 (1962); United States v. Parker, 292 F.2d 2 (6th Cir.
1961).
13 See, e.g., Lockhart v. United States, 293 F.2d 314 (8th Cir. 1961) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 1003 (1962); United States v. Parker, 292 F.2d 2 (6th Cir. 1961).
"'1Cf. Workman v. United States, 337 F.2d 226 (1st Cir. 1964). Compare Freeman
v. United States, 350 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1965); Chapin v. United States, 341 F.2d 900
(10th Cir. 1965); Pilkington v. United States, 315 F.2d 204 (4th Cir. 1963); United States
v. DeMario, 246 F. Supp. 786 (E.D. Mich. 1965); Williams v. United States, 231 F. Supp.
382 (E.D. Ky. 1964), and Rowe v. United States, 227 F. Supp. 666 (W.D. Wis. 1964),
with Marvel v. United States, 335 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1964); Rawls v. United States,
330 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1964); Cunningham v. United States, 256 F.2d 467 (5th Cir.
1958), and Real v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 235 (W.D. Ark. 1965).
11 Alden v. Montana, 234 F. Supp. 661, 670 (D. Mont. 1964).
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Whether ineligibility for parole is a rule 11 "consequence" has also
provoked conflict. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in
Munich v. United States,16 held that one who pleaded guilty without
knowledge that he would be ineligible for parole unquestionably did
not plead with an understanding of the consequences of his plea.17
The opposite result was reached in the District of Columbia Circuit
in Smith v. United States,8 on which the Trujillo court relied. The
Smith court noted that eligibility for parole is a benefaction of legis-
lative grace, and is not a "consequence" of which a defendant must
be aware in order to tender an acceptable plea. Ineligibility for
parole, therefore, must flow from a withholding of legislative grace,
and could not be a "consequence" of pleading.19
Trujillo was sentenced before rule 11 was amended, and it is to
its former language that the Fifth Circuit first looked. Acknowl-
edging that the term "nature of the charge" embraces the "conse-
quences of the plea" language incorporated in the present rule,
the court found the issue to be precisely that considered in Munich
and Smith.20 "It is obvious," the court concluded, that to understand
the nature of the charge the defendant need not be aware "of every
'but for' consequence which follows from a plea of guilty." 21 Cases
holding that a court need not inform a defendant of the loss of his
passport and ability to travel abroad upon a felony conviction,22 nor
of the possibility of deportation,23 loss of voting privileges, 24 or un-
desirable discharge from the armed services25 are cited by the court
in support of its test.26 Since ineligibility for parole is a matter of
the withholding of legislative grace, the court reasoned, quoting
Smith, it should be included in the category of "but for" conse-
quences which need not be explained to a defendant. 27
16 337 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1964).
17 ld. at 361, citing United States v. Diggs, 304 F.2d 929 (6th Cir. 1962) (dictum).
"8 324 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 957 (1964).
'
9 Id. at 441.
20 377 F.2d at 268.
21 Id.
22 Meaton v. United States, 328 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1964) (per curiam), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 916 (1965).
23 United States v. Parrino, 212 F.2d 919 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 840 (1954)
(Frank, J., dissented on basis of importance of consequence).
24 United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1963).
25 Redwine v. Zuckert, 317 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (per curiam).
26 377 F.2d at 268-69.
27 Id. at 269.
In approving the theoretical underpinnings of the Smith opinion,
the Fifth Circuit failed to consider the fact that the majority relied
heavily on the specific lack of prejudice to defendant Smith, who
pleaded guilty knowing that he could be incarcerated for as long as
forty years. Had parole been available, he still would have been
required to serve a longer sentence than the one actually imposed.28
Thus the actual detention fell within the range which the defendant
believed possible when he entered his plea. The opposite was true
in Trujillo, however. The defendant knew he could receive up to
twenty years if convicted, but if parole were available he could serve
as little as six years and eight months of the maximum sentence.20
Thus, imposition of a ten-year sentence without parole was clearly
prejudicial, for the defendant might serve over three years longer than
he had anticipated. Further, the internal analysis of Trujillo reveals
significant weaknesses. The court attaches undue importance to the
fact that parole is causally the product of legislative enactment and
not of the plea itself. "Consequence," however, admits of another
interpretation: while ineligibility for parole is a consequence of legis-
lative pronouncement, the statute's application to the particular case
at this early juncture in the criminal proceedings is the direct result
of the guilty plea. Were this not the proper interpretation of "con-
sequences" in a rule 11 context, it is difficult to imagine what the
term comprehends, since all the sanctions and procedures which are
brought to bear following acceptance of a guilty plea have their
origin in legislative enactments or established judicial precedent.
Since a crucial consideration for a defendant in formulating his plea
will be the specific period of his detention, any factors, irrespective
of formal causality, which affect the length of incarceration should
be explained. The high probability that a defendant in a marijuana
case is ignorant of the suspension of the normal practice of granting
parole renders the need for elucidation particularly acute. Thus, the
Trujillo analysis of "consequences" is unacceptable both for its un-
justified reliance on Smith and for its failure to recognize the prac-
tical dilemmas facing a defendant at the time of pleading.
324 F.2d at 440.
See Act of June 25, 1948, § 4204, 18 U.S.C. § 4202 (1964).
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